Labour search with endogenous outside option

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/16704

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Jain, Ritesh
dc.contributor.author	Murali, Srinivasan
dc.date.accessioned	2021-01-24T06:45:10Z	-
dc.date.available	2021-01-24T06:45:10Z	-
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.identifier.other	WP_IIMB_620
dc.identifier.uri	https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/16704	-
dc.description.abstract	We incorporate the extended version of Nash bargaining proposed by Vartiainen (2007) in a standard labour search and matching model to endogenously determine the outside option of workers along with their wages. We find that the optimal outside option of a worker under this framework is zero and this equilibrium maximizes social welfare when the economy is constrained efficient.
dc.publisher	Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
dc.relation.ispartofseries	IIMB Working Paper-620
dc.subject	Search and matching
dc.subject	Bargaining theory
dc.subject	Endogenous disagreement
dc.title	Labour search with endogenous outside option
dc.type	Working Paper
dc.pages	13p.
Appears in Collections:	2020

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