Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/21404
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dc.contributor.authorChatterjee, Kalyan
dc.contributor.authorBhalla, Manaswini
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-24T14:45:51Z-
dc.date.available2022-07-24T14:45:51Z-
dc.date.issued2011-08-16
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/21404-
dc.description.abstractWe study a model of electoral competition with office-seeking players and sincere voting. Players announce a policy position in a one-dimensional policy space but have private information about their true types that a effct policy outcomes in other dimensions. A policy announcement is then capable of signalling a player's type. Voters are Bayesian. We characterise the set of equilibria that arise in the announced dimension.
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management Bangalore
dc.relationElectoral competition with privately informed players
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIIMB_PR_2011-12_014
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.subjectElectoral competition
dc.titleElectoral competition with privately informed players
dc.typeProject-IIMB
Appears in Collections:2011-2012
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