Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/21404
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chatterjee, Kalyan | |
dc.contributor.author | Bhalla, Manaswini | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-07-24T14:45:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-07-24T14:45:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011-08-16 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/21404 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study a model of electoral competition with office-seeking players and sincere voting. Players announce a policy position in a one-dimensional policy space but have private information about their true types that a effct policy outcomes in other dimensions. A policy announcement is then capable of signalling a player's type. Voters are Bayesian. We characterise the set of equilibria that arise in the announced dimension. | |
dc.publisher | Indian Institute of Management Bangalore | |
dc.relation | Electoral competition with privately informed players | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | IIMB_PR_2011-12_014 | |
dc.subject | Political science | |
dc.subject | Electoral competition | |
dc.title | Electoral competition with privately informed players | |
dc.type | Project-IIMB | |
Appears in Collections: | 2011-2012 |
Google ScholarTM
Check
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.